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Siegel see her paper in  examines, inter alia, how EI might apply to the intuitively plausible case of an hallucinating animal and concludes that EC is not viable. However, only a few contributions take into account empirical research on hallucinations. The most relevant case is , who considers the case of pseudohallucinations and try to extend EC to these phenomena. Thus, most experimental work focuses on specific classes of hallucinations see e.
Particularly relevant for the project are general explanatory models. At the neurocognitive level, most models explain hallucinations as internally produced mental events which occur due to lack of external inhibition; for instance, top-down expectations  or intrinsic thalamocortical activations  which are unconstrained by sensory inputs. Conceptual problems: , ,  and  all endorse alternative definitions of hallucinations see also . Is lack of insight a defining property? More recently, inferentialism has been attacked by . In the perceptual case, presence has been explained in terms of acquaintance  and perceptual availability .
Relevant to this debate is the cognitive role of attention in perception , , ,  and in hallucinations ,  as well that of working memory for top-down expectation in perceptual processes , . Research plan and methods The core idea: multidisciplinarity is the successful methodology. Articulating the key idea: the three axis in detail. Conceptual puzzles for psychologists: Insight and lack thereof. Is it possible to arrive at a non-contentious usage of the term? Furthermore, it is important to consider that the lack of insight typical for hallucinations is sui generis: it occurs together with wakefulness contrary to dreams and maintained environmental awareness contrary to imagery.
Hallucinations and illusions. Illusions are normally conceived of as experiences as of X being F whereby X is not F. Similarly, hallucinations are described as experiences as of X being F whereby there is no X.
The rationale of such an experimental setting would be to study the occurrence of the same phenomenon in the presence of two different types of stimulus. Yet, according to the definitions given above, the first case should be considered a hallucination, and the second an illusion.
Furthermore, illusions thus conceived correspond to cases of misperception. Is this claim convincing? How exactly is perception supposed to go wrong in illusory cases, and how does it differ from the hallucinatory cases? Should illusions simply be positioned somewhere between hallucinations and perceptions ? Empirical puzzles for philosophers: Indiscriminability and pseudohallucinations. However, indiscriminability is not a necessary property of empirically-occurring hallucinations.
People who hallucinate are often aware that they are experiencing a hallucinaton such cases are sometimes referred to as pseudohallucinations, see . Can disjunctivists accommodate EC so as to cover also pseudohallucinatory cases , or should they deny that such cases are genuine hallucinations and thus claim that they raise no philosophical worries?
Are these strategies viable at all?
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Consider a person who sits in a room and hallucinates a dog sitting on a real sofa. How should disjunctivists treat such cases? According to one possible answer, it is the result of the judgement we make about the experience we are enjoying . How are we to assess the metacognitive account?
Is it viable? Or should we think that vividness is, as it were, a built-in property of hallucinatory experience? Accessibility vs. How can we make sense of the very idea of phenomenal presence? Two strategies have been proposed. First,  suggests that presence is to be understood in terms of accessibility or availability something is present to me if I have perceptual access to it. Second,  explains perceptual presence in terms of our acquaintance with the object presented to us.
In general, attention seems to play a fundamental role in our feeling that something is present: the fact that one can track and attend to an object normally counts as a mark of its presence , , , . Relevantly,  argues that hallucinatory phenomena are partially due to a deficit in our attentional system. Are availability and acquaintance really promising candidates? And how do they relate to attention? And which kind of attention stimulus-driven vs. Bibliographic references  Aleman A. Activities Calendar.
Call for Papers. Article First Online: 27 January This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access. Ali, R. Illusionism: Making the Problem of Hallucinations Disappear.
Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology
Chalmers, D. The matrix as metaphysics. In Philosophers Explore the Matrix p. Oxford University Press. Google Scholar. Gallagher, S. The phenomenological mind. Johnston, M. The obscure object of hallucination.
Hallucination | The MIT Press
Philosophical Studies, 1—3 , — CrossRef Google Scholar. Kennedy, M. Heirs of nothing: the implications of transparency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79 3 , — Martin, M. On Being Alienated. In Perceptual Experience.
McManus, D. Philosophy, 71 , — Pautz, A. Why explain visual experience in terms of content? In Perceiving the World. Schellenberg, S. The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience.
Related Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology
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